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JURIDIC ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATION II
JOSEPH F. COSTANZO, SJ.*

IN THE first instalment1 of this study we inquired into the representative practices of pre-Christian times to ascertain in what measure
they contributed to the long evolving historic process that culminated
in the Christian era in the Anglo-American tradition of representative
government as the institutional surety for constitutionalism. The Greek
pure democracy was characteristically direct governance. The Roman
Imperium rested on a balance of powers which like the Roman arch was
justified in the equilibrium it maintained and supported. The representative idea was obviously interior to every vicarious action and best
illustrated by the Roman lex regia. But the Graeco-Roman polileia
was absolute as well as plenary and constitutionalism was the political
description of actual governance, viz., the constitutio rei. The circumscription of power was at most an institutional distribution and balance
of forces. Disruption of the existing equilibrium was by revolutionary upheavals and with the turbulent civil wars of Greek and Roman history in
mind we may well appreciate the Aristotelian dread of stasis. Representative government as the institutional safeguard of a defined public
law and its empowerments were non-existent; nor for that matter was
constitutionalism understood as a self-imposed legal limitation. Roman
private law, however, did provide certain ingredients of stable trusteeship which the rulers of the Christian era, lay and ecclesiastical, were
to expand into a broad foundation for representative government. These
were, as we saw, the Roman procuratorium with its authorization, plena
potestas agendi, and mandatum, and the Justinian dictum, quod omnes
tangit ab omnibus approbetur. From private and proprietory they were
transferred and made applicable by a succession of experiments and
fruitful precedents to the public, corporate, and political domain. Since
we discounted the Teutonic polity theory which came into vogue at
Oxford during the later half of the nineteenth century as being simply
historically unfounded, we maintained as the purpose of our argumentum
that the Anglo-American system of representative governance was originally native to the English, and in its evolution of Catholic origins and
of Catholic promotion.
We observed that Innocent III set an extraordinary authoritative
precedent when he joined together the principle of consent and the
principle of representation in a limited matter of proprietary interests
*

Professor of Political Philosophy and Constitutional Law at Georgetown University,

Washington, D.C.
1. See Costanzo, Juridic Origins of Representation I, 23 Ford. L. Rev. 123 (1934).
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and, by the sixth and twelfth canons of the Fourth Lateran Council,
enjoined the universal practice of representative assemblies amongst the
metropolitans and the religious orders. The influence of papal pressure
on the institutional evolution of the representative idea was exerted at
the two oecumenical Councils of Lyons (1245 and 1274), the legatine
Council at Bourges of 1225, and in direct imitation of the latter, the
English provincial synod convened by Archbishop Langton in 1226.
Both the French and English assemblies were the first instances of the
use of proctors in either country in clerical assemblies since the Fourth
Lateran Council of 1215. The transference of these principles and practices - from the restricted area of private corporate communities and the
limited financial objective to the public domain-the political, the national jurisdiction with its plenary legislative and fiscal powers-must
undergo the slow historical process that gives life and stability to the
growth of an institution. This process whereby the representative idea
gradually matured into the civil representative system and finally culminated in representative governance in England must yet be fermented
by intermediary ecclesiastical influences, 3 -the Dominican Order and the
English Synodal Convocations. In a confluence of events, the designation of primary and motor influence may not be more than conjectural.
But neither should the circumambient environment of ideas and practices
be minimized. Causal relations may not be as easily assigned in group actions as in individual activity but conditions and contingencies may be
identified where similarity of motives and precedents obtain.
By the thirteenth century the provincial synods cease to be composed
of bishops and abbots only; they include representatives of the cathedral clergy-those living in communal association. As yet, the diocesan
or lower clergy-those not living in communities-have not been included. It is in this century that a confluence of events occur most
similar to one another and their chronological sequence strongly intimates an immediate influence and concrete imitation. The development
2. In actuality events come about not through the application of theories but through
experiments; the theories serve either as guiding lines or as explanations; they are never
applicable in their entirety nor with inexorable logic. For example, the principle of the
equality of men and the correlative, the consent of the governed, do not neces-arily conduce to the historical development of representative democracy. They may just as likely
lead to an enlightened and just monarchial rule. But in both instances these principles
are the ethical ultimates.
3. Cf. Barker, The Dominican Order and Convocation (1913); Clarke, Medieval Representation and Consent (1936); Royal Historical Society, Documents Illustrating the
Activities of the General and Provincial Chapters of the English Black Monks 12151540, Camden Third Series (Pantin ed. 1931-37); Galbraith, Constitution of the Dominican
Order 1216-1360 (1925).
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of representation in the English State synchronizes with the thirteenth
century; a representative parliament begins to be seen in the middle of
the century, and is fully grown by its end. Concurrently (with some
priority in time) ecclesiastical representation descends from the cathedral chapter to the inclusion of the diocesan clergy, a development that
occurs first and only in England. This latter eventuality is consequent
in time to the arrival of the Dominican Friars in England. It is then
with more than provocative interest that we inquire briefly into the
Dominican ratio gubernandi, in order to ascertain the extent of the influence of the Dominican Institute on other contemporary developments
of similar sort.
THE DOMINICANS AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
The Dominican Order is characteristically a model type of representative democracy.
"The government is entrusted to a hierarchy of chapters; the conventual chapter
ruled the house, the provincial chapter ruled the province and the general chapter
ruled the whole order. The general chapter laid down certain rules; the provincial
chapter amplified them according to the particular needs of the province; the conventual chapter applied them to individual cases. .

.

. both the general and pro-

vincial chapters, especially the latter, both made and executed ordinances." 4

Power was not, as the hierarchy at first suggests, delegated from above,
rather it ultimately derived from the convents or communities. This
was secured by the use of representatives.
"The general chapter was composed of representatives of the provinces elected in
the provincial chapter. . . .The provincial chapter in its turn included in its ranks
representatives of the convent. ..."

The conventual chapter elected a representative who was invested with
full power to deliberate and to vote for his electors. He was entrusted
with the business of his convent and when he spoke he was bound to
distinguish between his own opinion and that of his electors. The conventual chapter also chose two electors for the election of the provincial
prior and it had the right of forwarding petitions through the socius.
The provincial chapter, in addition to official members, thus consisted
of the prior and one socius from each house in the province. It was
usually a large body. The provincial chapter appointed four officers
known as deffinitores by whom all business was transacted except elections. A special electoral chapter was held to choose the prior of the
province. The general chapter was a small body, consisting of one elect4. Galbraith, op. cit. supra note 3 at 37.
5. Id. at 37-38.
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ed representative from each province. To it belonged the function of
altering the constitution (with the consent of three successive assemblies) and the power to elect, to punish and to depose the master-general of the order. The Dominican Order is constitutionally, de iure,
democratic, i.e., of popular determination, and institutionally, as its elective system shows, of truly representative governance. Supreme sovereign power is vested in the General Chapter which is composed of representatives freely elected by local communities and who are entrusted
with plenary proctorial powers to act for the general good of the entire
order in the name of their conventual constituents and to bind the same
by the commitments of the General Assembly.
"It is the most perfect example that the Middle Ages have produced of the faculty
of monastic corporations for constitutions for constitution-building."0

When St. Dominic founded his illustrious order in 1216, he was constrained by the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council that no more new
orders should be founded and to adapt for his followers the rule of an
order already established. His ratio guberandi then is not a novel contrivance but, providentially, the most advanced summation of the tried
precedents and fruitful practices of an ever-widening tradition of older
religious communities. The Austin canons, who in 1063 were instituted
without sovereign general councils, were the first to have evolved the
idea of the chapter of full members of a particular religious house as
an organized constituency with judicial and executive authority. In the
tenth century, the Cluniac order gave the first marked impetus to the
conciliar plan of legislation by instituting closer association of the various convents. Councils comprised of priors of daughter houses and the
abbot of Cluny convened annually and their decrees were binding upon
the whole order. Let the Cluniacs be credited for being the first to
evolve the idea of general chapters for purposes of legislation and discipline, albeit under the control of the Abbots. To this dual development of particular and general chapters for purposes of legislation and
administration, the Cistercians in the beginning of the twelfth century
wrought a significant change by conferring upon the abbot of Citeaux
less powers (than those of the Abbot of Cluny) and enlarging the responsibilities and powers of the general chapter. The Premonstratensian
Canons of 1129 imitated this Cistercian arrangement rather closely and
provided the basis for the Dominican constitution and organization.
The importance of the general chapter was vastly enhanced when the
Carthusians in 1142 conferred larger powers upon it. Thus by a dual
6. Barker, op. it. supra note 3 at 18, citing Hauck, Kirchengeschicte Deutscblands,
iv, 390.
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process, which began with the local community and at the same time
descended from above, the concentric circles of a community of communities with a supreme general government composed of representatives of local chapters evolved in the history of religious orders concurrently with the history of ecclesiastical synods and general councils. Is
it then surprising that the Universal Church, by its ideas, its procedures, and practices should contribute to the history of institutional
development of the west the basic essential elements of representative
government?
Though the Dominicans are part of that development of representation in the General Councils of the Church and in its provincial synods,
and of the tradition of representative government in the religious orders,
they do constitute an innovation-not in theory-but in the detailed
precision of their organization, in the concrete circumscription of the
powers of the abbot which in other orders did in practice interpose
itself too effectively in the relations between the convent and the rest
of the order. St. Dominic, in statesman-like manner, institutionalized,
i.e., embodied efficaciously, the constitutional ideas of monasticism in
inviolable procedures which would distinguish discretion from presumption, legitimacy from usurpation, counsel from authority. Thus the
general chapter of religious orders expressed and put into action all
over western Europe the idea of an assembly with legislative and executive powers, composed of members drawn from communities which together made up the whole order. Both within the local and general
groups the size, coherence, and powers essential for political representation (legislation, judicial, administrative) were provided by the religious orders for civil empowerments to study and imitate. The conjunction of the principle of consent and of representation on fiscal business was the papal contribution. The unique contribution of St. Dominic's Order is the forceful use of representatives elected by local communities for the conduct of affairs of the entire order. Representation
of office has definitely ceased to be virtual and vicarious; representation
is now of the community,7 it is actual as well as vicarious. In order to
understand better how the two distinct developments, of representative
consent for clerical taxation (introduced by the papacy) and representative democracy (best exemplified by the Dominican Friars), promoted political representation and civil representative government, we
must look summarily into the intermediary influence of the representa7. Clarke, op. cit. supra note 3 at 301, 303. The Order of Grandmont first developed
the idea of representing the community by elected proctors rather than by officials, and
they also entrusted those elected with a definite mandate. Since these religious lived In
complete retirement from the world they could hardly have influenced civilian events.
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five convocation of the English secular clergy. For, let us note, it is
not till after the arrival of Dominicans in England in 1221, that representation of the lower diocesan clergy are included in the provincial
synods and this we are persuaded to be a consequence of the practice
and influence of the Black Friars.

Tnn ExGuISH SYNOD
Consequent to the arrival of the Dominican Friars in England in
1221, a gradual expansion of representation in the English provincial
synod develops until it ultimately comprises the proctors of diocesan
clergy. In 1213 when Stephen Langton,' Archbishop of Canterbury
produced the Charter of Henry I to the assembly convened at St. Paul's
in a memorable prelude to the Magna Charta, bishops, abbots, priors
and deans attended. In 1225 Archbishop Langton slightly extended his
summons when he requested the presence of Bishops, abbots, priors,
deans, and archdeacons. In 1226, five years after the settlement of the
Dominican Friars in England, proctors are added for the first time from
each chapter of cathedral and prebendal churches, and by its inclusion
of representatives from monasteries, and from other religious and collegiate houses, this convocation went beyond the capitular representation of the legatine Council at Bourges. Scarcely half a century later in
the reign of Edward I, Kilwardy, onetime provincial prior of the
Dominicans and now successor to Stephen Langton at Canterbury, summons to his convocation of 1273 not only capitular clergy but also
diocesan clergy. The last and most advanced step of all is taken by
the Franciscan Peckham who in 1283 called what has been properly
designated as the Model Convocation of the province of Canterbury.
Bishops, abbots, priors and other heads of religious houses, deans of
cathedral and collegiate churches, and archdeacons were summoned to
appear in person or by proctors; and, the significant innovation, bishops
are enjoined to assemble and instruct the diocesan clergy to the intent
that they elect two proctors from each diocese, and the cathedral and
collegiate churches designate one proctor with plenary powers and instructions of "treating and consenting" in the name of their constituents. From 1226 and 1283 the advance is slow but steadfast and we
may conjecture with the force of inferential argument of the influence
of Dominican and Franciscan Orders upon the expanding experience of
the provincial synod to the inclusion of the secular clergy. Stephen
Langton was an intimate associate of the Dominicans. Kilwardy, his
8. For an appreciative study of Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, as leader
of the constitutional cause, cf. Powicke, Stephen Langton (1928). Barker calls Langton
"father of English liberty", op. cit. supra note 3 at 46 and "friend of English liberty" at 51.
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successor, had been provincial prior of that order, and Peckham, who
took the last all-embracing step, was a Franciscan whose order had improved its organization by refashioning its own provincial chapters on
the model of the Dominican ratio. The progress of 1226 and 1283 is significant but hardly sufficient. Stephen Langton added for the first time
representation of monasteries and other religious houses-possibly of
the Dominican convents, too--to capitular representation (as at
Bourges) but the principle of representation is still restricted to those
clerics associated in a community life. Not till 1283 does representation
descend to the inclusion of the ordinary diocesan clergy. The improvement of 1283 on 1273 is the election of the proctors by the constituents
themselves and accordingly actual representation is affirmed as superior
to virtual representation. In all these successive steps of expansion the
motive force may be found in the need of meeting the financial demands
which both the Papacy and the English Crown made on the Church
during the reign of Henry III, and which the Crown still continued to
urge in the reign of Edward I, the operative principle-quod omnes
tangit-according to the injunction and precedent of the fourth Lateran
Council, the exemplary procedure, the Dominican representative system. The pressure of taxation and its conditio sine qua non, consent,
combined to fructify the best expedient as yet devised for individual
cooperation through corporate responsibility, namely, representation
with proctorial powers. As the need for money, papal and royal, increased, the appeal extended to the lower non-communal clergy, and
what had served as the ideas and procedures for the upper clergy were
applied to the lower unquestioningly because these had been more than
mere prescriptive rights, they were principles touching upon the inviolability of person and possessions.
THE POLITICAL LEAVEN OF THE CHURCH

The more closely modern scholarship scrutinizes our medieval heritage the more frequent are the admissions of the vast indebtedness of
modern political and civil liberties to the ecclesiastical influence and
direction of medieval social and political history.
To begin with, the religious clergy were from earliest times experimenting with communal life. Emphasizing in every rule that charity
is the supreme law and prudence the guide of life, they developed government through discussion and counsel even in such instances where
the ultimate decision was monarchial. The value of information from
every quarter, the preference for corporate responsibility, the wise attachment to the lessons of tradition, the respectful appreciation of the
counsel of elders no doubt flowered from the christian virtues of hu-
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mility, simplicity, and submission as a guard against pride of the intellect and arbitrary action. Frequent and orderly assemblies developed
parliamentary procedures and usages. From these ecclesiastical practices two results vastly significant for the political domain ensued: the
binding of the minority by majority decision, a principle of prudential
expediency later formulated by canon law, 9 and, secondly, the office of
the procuratorium. For participation in larger assemblies or for the
more facile contraction of inter-group agreements proxies were duly
elected to determine the course of action in the name of their
constituents and to bind them thereby. In the civil domain, we find
instances of similar vicarious activities, particularly the jury practices
in the reign of Henry II and the extensive use of knights by Henry III.
Their practices do signify a representative function but they scarcely exceed the elementary duties of information, the assessment and collection of taxes, reports on the conduct of sheriffs, the registry of a local
community's opinion or decision in an ad hoc. Their offices are expanded with the objectives of inventory or, at most, with the restricted mandate of a trustee. Ad loquendum, ad ostendendum, ad recognoscendum
essentially meant "bearing the record". The closest instances fall far
short of the procuratorium. Even as late as 1254 (late in relation to the
ecclesiastical practices) the knights merely report decisions previously
made by their respective counties. When Henry III's writ of September 1261 summoned the knights to a central body at Windsor to discuss
public affairs the purpose remained entirely consultative.
The vanguard, then, of institutional development was clerical. In
designating taxation as the motor force for the extension of representation amongst the secular clergy we must not fail to stress, even if need
be repeatedly, the Christian principles on which such an expediency was
evolved. Representative system and representative government may not
be the only and inevitable consequences of the logic inherent in the
equality of men, in the consequent immunity from the arbitrary and
in the inviolability of rights to possessions, but they have proved to be
the best workable arrangement for the security of these rights as well
as the best expression of corporate responsibility. The historical fact is
that representative government in the civil domain did rise out of the
9.

"From the earliest period in its history the English Parliament has accepted the

principle that the wishes of the majority are decisive. It is probable that the principle
itself was derived from the canon law. In this, as in many other instances, ideas drawn
from the canon law had a large influence upon the minds of those who were creating a
common law in the thirteenth century. It is clear from the Year Books that in the

fifteenth century it is accepted as an ordinary and obvious principle." 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law 431 (1922).
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medieval atmosphere of thought and ideas and those ideas were of
clerical origin and of ecclesiastical promotion. We have observed that
it was two friar-archbishops, Kilwardy, the Dominican, and Peckham,
the Franciscan, who brought the Dominican system of government by
representative chapter into the English Church to make representation
a permanent and regular part of the Church so that their religious organizations and the provincial church synods offered models of experience to their nation. We must conceive of these influences as part of a
more enlarged comprehensive mentality-that of the medieval theology
of politics-and this meant a divine conception of human personality
which was unknown in the ancient world. And around this central
truth medieval political theory and governmental practices, lay and
ecclesiastic, built up an expanding tradition of securities, guaranties, and
procedures that made for the free man, the homo liber et legalis. The
friars, particularly in England (on the Continent the onus was borne
more by the bishops who were in closer proximity with a multitude of
overweening princes) represented the doctrines of civil independence in
the universities and country at large. Bracton's De Legibus, Simon de
Montfort's indebtedness to the Franciscans' Song of Lewes, 10 the theory
of kingship taught by Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, and by Adam
Marsh at Oxford, Stephen Langton and the Magna Carta, the Dominicans as confessors and counsellors of kings, 1 to designate but several
instances out of a whole contexture of Christian society, could not but
work as a leaven upon the national history of England. Already in
1240 we find Matthew Paris representing the bishops as quoting the
principle that what touches all must be approved by all. What the
clerics secured for themselves in the struggle over "Spiritualities" passed
to the laymen. Feudal consent which had been based on the equality of
men had lacked representation. The ecclesiastics preserved the principle
of equality through a consent indirectly applied in the majority decision
of the corporate community. As feudalism faded for the civilians, they
learned to apply to their newly formed communal groups the lessons of
the clerics. 2 We have stressed the importanc.e and influence of the
ecclesiastical religious examples of representation, as instanced in the
three oecumenical Church councils of the thirteenth century, the Dominican and Franciscan Institutes and the development ensuing in England of the English Provincial Convocation to the inclusion of the
diocesan clergy.
10. Song of Lewes, introd. xviii (Kingsford ed., 1890).
11. Jarrett, Friar Confessors of English Kings, Home Counties Magazine (June, 1910).
12. For the infiltrating influence clerical attendance in Parliament could bring to Its
development cf. Reich, The Parliamentary Abbots to 1470, 17 U. of Cal. Publications in
History 265 (1942).
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We may ask if there were any sociological conditions in England
which rendered the ecclesiastical influence upon the civil development
in England more likely and efficacious than on the, continent. Even as
late as the fourteenth century the French provincial synod does not go
beyond the representation of chapters and similarly in Spain where the
Spanish Cortes develops and advances beyond the ecclesiastical practices. In Germany, clerical representation does not descend below the
chapters and the provincial synods convene irregularly. In France
where the development came closest to the English probably because of
the two oecumenical Councils at Lyons and of the legatine Council at
Bourges the advance is arrested short of the English achievement. The
A tats Giniraux summon to attendance proctors of convents and chapters but only because they are part of the feudal hierarchy. A reasonable explanation may be drawn from the fixed localism of the English
counties which paralleled the local life of the diocesan clergy. The geographical isolation of England and its remoteness from Rome might
have strengthened the expression of communal as well as personal feudal
claims with the evolution of an organic national self-consciousness particularly through the work of the justices which began with the reign of
Henry II. This dual process of nationalization, drawing its vigor from
a stable local life, developed in England (more so than on the continent)
a political community of communities. Consequently wherever there
was an identity of interest or problem, the laymen were to learn from
the clergy. But English legal development abetted this interpenetrating
influence. English custom law became common law without ceasing to
be custom law. On the continent, under the influence of Roman revival, custom law surrender to common civil law imposed from above
by the sovereign with only remnants of concessionary favors toward
native custom law at most. Consequently, in England, through the influence of canon law upon the common law the Innocentian interpolation of quod omnes tangit may have operated more efficaciously with
Edward I than with a continental monarch. And the motive was the
same with parliamentary growth as it was with the English synod convocation, the papal demand for money and the royal need of revenue.
The Model Convocation of the province of Canterbury convened by
Peckham in 1283, notable for its extension of the summons to include
proctors of the diocesan clergy, pointedly illustrates the interpenetration of the clerical and lay world, for it assembled under the royal
summons. The stamp of royal confirmation served to make that form
of 1283 authoritative and very likely served as the precedent for the
premunientes clause of Edward I when he summoned the clergy to the
Parliament of 1294. Each bishop must attend, premonishing (praemuni-
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entes) the dean and chapter of his cathedral church and the archdeacons and all the clergy of his diocese--causing the dean and archdeacons to attend in their proper persons and the chapter through one,",
the clergy through two fit proctors with full and sufficient power. The
form the Church had adopted for its own provincial synod is used by
the king for the inclusion of the Church as one of the estates of the
realm in parliament.
Thus we have seen that the Church and her religious orders have
provided the idea, composition, and procedure of representation to the
distinctive native development in England. The identical principlequod omnes tangit-permeates both clergy and laity, the same application to the same motive-the demand for money, either papal or royal,
and a concomitant and correlative extension of the proctorial powers
to the local unit of the shire and the diocese. It is representation of
the communities with full proctorial power to bind the constituents. The
reinforcement of the baronage by shire and borough representatives,
toward the comprehension of the national parliament, finds its precedent in the reinforcement of the episcopate by the proctor of chapters.
And the non-communal diocesan clergy, considered as a quasi community for the purpose of the Model Convocation of 1283 and the
Model Parliament of 1294, points strongly to the still lower laical unit,
the representative of the vill. Such interweaving of influence, such a
common deposit of ideas and precedents was but the obvious and
natural result of the organic structure of medieval society. But the
originality of representative governance is Catholic, 14 papal in promo13. The summoning of a representative of the chapter is considered as "the first germ
of our (English) praemunientes clause" whereby under Edward I the whole inferior clergy
were for the first time represented in the national Parliament. In this instance, too, consent for the grant of an aid was requested from the corporate unit. Barker, op. cit. supra
note 3 at 32-33.
14. Barker, op. cit. supra note 3 at 27: "When one sees St. Dominic and de Montfort
in conjunction in Southern France-when one remembers what St. Dominic did for the

principle of representation in the Church, and de Montfort's son for that principle In
the State--one is tempted to find some common ground, for their allegiance to the principle, and to find that common ground in Southern France. But that would be pure conjecture; and it would be safer to say that the common ground between the two was a
common adhesion to the same idea, an idea always cherished by the Church, of power

as a trust given by the community, and of the community as in some sense sovereign of
itself, even if it delegated its sovereignty to a inagister. It is an idea with a long history.
It is expressed by Ulpian (Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorern, utpote curn popuis . . . ei et in eum omne suum imperiurn et potestatem conferat): It is expressed in

Peter Damiani (Potestas est in populo a sunmo data Domine): it is expressed in the
Song of Lewes by de Montfort's partisan. It underlies the organization of the Hospltallers: it underlies that of the Dominicans. Whenever men conceive of a group clearly
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tion, religious in precedent and experience, ecclesiastical in the synodal
convocations. Its growth and extension in English ecclesiastical and
civil practices was mutually compenetrant; but the notable exemplar
is the Dominican Order and the extent of its influence upon both provincial synods and the civil parliament is a conjecture of compelling
moral persuasion. Theirs is the highest expression of the development
of the representative principle in the thirteenth century Church and in
England its first consummate example.
.

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

We have already noted that the idea of representation is as ancient
as vicarious action. A group of individuals are, for certain purposes,
religions or civil, deemed to be one and may therefore be summed up
as it were, figuratively, in the person of a king or priest. And in noncommunal associations one individual would stand for another either as
steward or trustee with or without powers of attorney. The mandate or
responsibility would be either explicitly defined or implicitly assumed
or gradually fixed by conventional practices. In the Catholic ecclesiastical synods the vicarious function was representative in virtue of the
office of the bishop and on lower levels in virtue of power delegated
from above. In religious assemblies with only consultative functions,
the power of the superior or abbot derives from the religious institute
to which its members were bound by their vow of obedience. They
enjoy the prerogative of expressing themselves without the powers of
governing. They represent, and though systems of representation may
vary from the loosest to the strongest manifestation and contingency,
it still is not representative government. In religious orders where representative government rules, the following conditions obtain: first, the
local community freely elects its own delegates at the instance, of course,
of superior authority. These delegates are not mere agents of administration either of their own constituents or of a superior power. They
are invested with a mandate that has a double purpose: the general
benefit of the universal society as well as the immediate interest of their
own conventicle constituency. Above all their proctorial power transcends that of a trustee. It owes judgment, not blind obedience, to
their electors. They must account for their actions to them but they
may claim independence of action and commitment in the light of the
general common good and in virtue of their presumed superior comand strongly as a community or brotherhood, they must conceive of it as sovereign of
itself; whenever they seek to realize that self-sovereignty in deed as well as in word,
they are driven beyond the conception of power as in its nature representative to the
actual use of representative institutions."
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petence. Their commitments bind their constituents and they may
contribute to or modify the institutional law. They are not constrained
by any superior personal dictation save by public law, substantive and
procedural. The representatives legislate, adjudicate, execute: in a
word, they govern. Representative system may exist without representative government but not vice versa. Free election, a temporal and
revocable delegation of powers, accountability for the mandate entrusted,
and the power to bind their constituents constitute the powers of representative governance. Such a government may obtain in private corporations or in public. In the latter public law and .a national jurisdiction coincide with geographical frontiers and a coherent society. Representative government in public law and national sovereignty is political, i.e., it operates directly to the public good (res publica as distinguished from private interest), to the survival of the common (national
benefit) as differentiated from the individual welfare. Toward the
maturation of representative government thus described social and
economic factors touching upon person and possessions operate in the
control of power and in the legal investiture of rights and liberties.
We have seen that the conversion of individual counsel and consent
to corporate responsibility through the plenary proctorial mandate
transformed representative systems into representative governance. Consent as a practical source-of power was recognized as far back as Solon
and the oldest institutionalization of popular consent was custom law.
Radical differences separate the inner meaning and content of counsel
and consent, in governance or custom law of the pre-Christian and.
Christian eras. The Christian innovation was the ethico-theological exigencies of consent and its rational presuppositions. Not consent alone
but consent in obedience to the prerogatives of human personality.
Pagan custom law was rigidly fixed in religious immobility and the future was arrested in the archaic past. Relief existed only in the discretionary benevolence of the ruler or, as the most democratic achievement
of Roman history, in the tribunal veto. Graeco-Roman civilization with
all its vaunted cultural achievements did not provide the philosophical
ratio for progress nor for that matter reach into the significance of time
and its correlative, change. The Parmidean-Heraclitean antimony was
only inadequately resolved by Aristotle and awaited for the Christian
revelation of the transcendence of man for the true measure and direction of human progress. St. Isidore, enlarging upon St. Augustine's dynamic conception of temporal law was the first of the Christian Fathers
to define (with a sound juridical perception) the material0 constituents
15.

Etymologies 10, 6: "Law should be honesta, just, possible, according to nature,

conformed to the customs of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful,

1954]

JURIDIC ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATION II

309

of positive law as the reasonable presuppositions of choice and thereby
conferred upon customary law those prerogative attributes which English legal history 16 ascribe to prescriptive rights, franchises, immunities, privileges, and liberties. Gratian, who incorporated St. Isidore's
divisions and definitions of law into his Decrelum, was so impressed
with the doctrine of sound utility in accord with reason and faith which
St. Isidore's analysis of popular consent presupposed in customary law,
that he concluded that all valid law was really custom law, that part
which is written down being called constitutio sive jus while that part
which is not written is known as consuetudo. St. Isidore's teaching of
the material (intrinsic) content of law as constitutive of its ethicaljuridical justice, viz., of its reasonableness as distinct from its legitimacy which derives from authoritative will differentiated validity from
legitimacy which was hopelessly confused in Roman formalism and
Greek Polity. The embodiment of consent in custom law according to
Christian doctrine is best attested to in the twelfth century by Henry
of Bracton, Archdeacon of Barnstaple, and, at his death in 1268, Chancellor of Exeter Cathedral.
"Though almost all countries use statutes and written laws (legibus et iure scripto),
England alone uses unwritten law and custom (iure non scripto et consuetudine).
Unwritten law is established or defined by precedent. It will not be ridiculous to
accept the unwritten law of England as law, since that has the force of law which
has been defined and approved by royal authority 1and by the advice and assent of
magnates and the common consent of the realm."'

From the earliest times of English history-clearly with the Anglo-Saxon
Witan-the idea of counsel and consent was bound up with law and
the administration of justice according to the law of the land. AngloSaxon kingship ministered a power which was held to be derived from
the subjects and strictly limited by the Witan or National Council,
which, though not a representative assembly in the modern acceptation
of the word, stood in relation to the king as the representative of the
people. This Council of leaders and wise men had a direct share in
every act of government, and, though at times strong kings restricted
their participation in the government, in the two cardinal matters of
dear, also so as not to contain anything which by its obscurity might lead to wariness;
it should be devised for the common good of all the citizens, and not for the private
interests only of some individual." Similarly 2 id. 10, 1, 2, 3. It is repeated in Ivo of
Chartes, Panormia, the handbook of canon law.
16. Pollock, Essays in Law 57 (1922): "... there is a real link between the medimval
doctrine of the law of nature and the principles of Common Law. It is given by the use
-correct in both systems, though constant, indeed exclusive in the Common Law, and
rather sparing in the Canon Law-of the words 'reason' and 'reasanable'."
17. 2 Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 19 (Woodbine ed. 1915).
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legislation and the imposition of extraordinary taxation, the right of
the Witan to give counsel and consent was at all times recognized. The
notion is at bottom an ethical one; it is limitation as well as direction
of power. As Bracton wrote in the thirteenth century: "The king has
his councillors who are his associates; he who has associates has a
master."' 8
The Norman conquest transformed England from a loosely related
kingdom to a closely knit feudal structure. To the king as supreme
feudal lord as to the lesser lordships, his vassals, the tenants-in-chief,
must give "aid" and "counsel" according to the rights and jurisdictions
incident to feudal tenure. "Aid" was generally expressed at first by
the feudal levy of military service; "counsel" meant periodic suit at
court, to give advice and help settle difficult cases. Attendance was,
under the Normans, compulsory. This forced participation 0 in government administration fixed the exercise of counsel into the institutions of the Great and Small Councils and as such operated as a check
upon autocratic depositions and as a defense of feudal rights. The
Magna Charta of 1215 bears eloquent testimony to the constitutional
consequences of counsel and consent. No scutage or aid, other than the
three regular feudal aids, is to be imposed except per commune concilium regni and the exact procedure for obtaining the consent is defined.
Consent was implied in customary law, prefeudal and feudal, and in
the aids incident to feudal tenure. It is in regard to the extra-feudal
aids that the exercise of explicit, ad hoc consent, operated to constitutional intents. The right to determine the necessity and amount of these
gracious aids lay not with the lord but with the suitors of his court.
Feudal theory then made concretely activating the doctrine of consent
by relating it to taxation. According to the feudal system, that my
vassal's vassal is not my vassal nor my lord's lord my lord, the king's
contractual relations terminated with the tenants-in-chief. When these
consented to a gracious aid they represented in a sort of vague way
the rear-vassals and committed them to the grant. It is precisely at
this point that England happily escaped the national disaster that befell
the continental countries, particularly France, namely the danger of a
system of private bargains whereby the magnates would secure for
themselves permanent exemption from taxation and sever themselves
from the common national causes. Only by removing the personal veto
18. The authenticity of this statement is not certain but it makes its appearance shortly
after Bracton's death and may be taken to indicate current views as to the nature of
the king's council. See I Bracton, op. cit. supra note 17 at 252, 332-333.
19. Which may be the reason why England did not dissolve as did contemporary
France into great dynastic feudatories.
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of the dissenting or absentee magnate would such a danger be averted.
Feudal consent was drawn out of its personal, individualistic involvement by the slowly expanding concept of the corporate character of
the king's council just as collected counsel gradually enlarged into collective counsel.
Consent came to mean consensus and concord or simply consensual
participation. This development was in no small measure due to the
process of taxing the clergy. Ecclesiastics in their baronial capacity
were subject to the terms of the feudal tenure as laymen were; they
served in the king's council and assented or rejected the royal demands for gracious aids. As prelates, however, who had received the
ring and staff from ecclesiastical authorities, their income drawn from
tithes and alms--known as spiritualities-were deemed exempt from
taxation since they were avowedly reserved for a sacred purpose. The
lesson of the Saladin Tithe (which fell on all clerics as well as on the
laity, on spiritualities as on temporalities) was not lost upon the English Exchequer and the same plan was thereafter several times imposed
in the name of national emergencies. When these exactions culminated
in the excesses of King John, it is no wonder to find Stephen Langton,
the Archbishop of Canterbury, leading the barons at St. Albans. It is
the menace to ecclesiastical immunity, the attack upon the spiritualities, that provoked the resistance from below. These touched the lower
clergy with greater inconvenience than the upper clergy who benefited
from temporalities as well. At the fourth Lateran Council in 1215 the
decree entitled de tallis a clericis non exigendis was issued for the protection of this privilege. But the crown succeeded to force exactions
by threat of the legal lockout whereby the clergy were denied the defense of the courts. It was at this crucial time that the doctrine of
consent was saved by the clerical interpolation of the maxim embedded in
the private law of Rome; quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur.
Private proprietary interests are protected by the notion of corporate
responsibility of the class "touched," and in this instance the ecclesiastical class set exemplary precedents to the corresponding growing selfconsciousness of the communitas regni. Just as the law of great men
became in time the law of all free Englishmen, so too from above the
corporate self-consciousness of the baronagium (so markedly evident
in King John's reign and manifest in the 61st clause of the Great Charter) expanded as to embrace first the minor barons, then the knights, and
so on broadening toward a sense of a national solidarity of the English
realm. In its exuberant youth what was the House of Commons if not
a community of communities. As private jurisdictions are eliminated
by the quo warranto and seignorial responsibilities are absorbed by the
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justices in eyre, feudal personalism shades into communal assertion
curiously instanced in the firma burgi. As early as 1159 the Policraticus
of John of Salisbury gave eloquent testimony to this sense of salus
publica and the cohaerentia of a commonwealth whose analogue is the
human body. In 1258 the English barons wrote to Pope Alexander IV
that Henry III submitted to the counsel of the magnates, without whom
he is unable to govern his kingdom, and they add with a sense of virtual
representation that England is a body politic and is ruled by the community of the realm.
The doctrine of consent, as it lost strength on an individualist basis,
was reinvigorated by the concept of corporate responsibility. This ensued from ecclesiastic experience and in England more vividly from the
Provincial Synodal development as it reached down into the lower noncommunal clergy. The magnates had established the right of consent
for gracious aids and the lower clergy had done as much for the taxation of the spiritualities. The action of the canons of Salisbury in
1225 induced Stephen Langton to the first breach in this direction. The
explanation thus far is partial. To have saved the doctrine and effective exercise of consent by corporate capacity action another device
was actually necessary, the representative principle. Counsel had transformed consent into a corporate collectivity. Representation with proctorial powers would make it viable and practical. Unanimity grew increasingly a practical impossibility and still retained its disintegrating
individualism. Absentee or dissenting barons could paralyze effective
and necessary action. It is to the credit of the clerics that they too
contributed the representative principle (as well as the representative
system) to give practical meaning and effectiveness to their other
contribution, corporate responsibility. We must now review the secular
representative practices and observe in select instances how the clerical
examples and precedents contributed to their fruition into representative governance.
CIVIL REPRESENTATIVE PRACTICES

The idea of law as custom underlay the medieval doctrine of consent. The same concept played an even more direct part in the use of
representation, at least for legal and administrative purposes. Customary law could not be administered without local knowledge. This
was due not merely to the complete lack of jurisprudence, a systematic
science of law, administered by a professional body of learned jurists,
but also to the disruptions of the barbarian invasions and the frequent
shifts of population uprooted from their native territory. Consequently
the inevitable conflict of law was awkwardly but necessarily resolved
by the personalism of Frankish and Germanic laws alongside with the
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territorialism of jurisdictional laws-hence the necessity for the close
connection between law and knowledge of it by the parties concerned.
This was subsequently accentuated by the localism of the feudal structure with the benefit at this time of the court of peers or co-vassals.
Local knowledge is now appended to trial by equals to ensure the accuracy of the law as well as to protect against the prejudices of superior
intrusions.
When the king's justices went on circuit of the realm and central courts
and common law were slowly and laboriously being formulated, it followed as a matter of course that local knowledge should be expressed
by sworn local representatives or juries. The Norman sworn inquest
accentuated this practice. The Doomesday Book stresses how natural
and reasonable a method "knowledge on the spot" was obtained through
carefully selected witnesses under oath. The representative idea is expressed through representative men who spoke "for all" about the locality, the hundred or wapentake. The second instance of representation are the juries of Henry H. Their office was a virtual representation, their functions mainly declarative, and accordingly required
cognizance of local affairs in the representative men. These juries are
aptly designated the juries of recognition, ad recognoscendum, to distinguish them from the juries of Grand Assizes who testified to the
existence or non-existence of criminal actions in the community.
In 1213 a distinct intimation of a novel development occurred when
King John summoned four discreet knights from each shire to speak
(ad loquendum) with him at Oxford concerning business of the realm.
While most probably these knights came to report local information, a
general purpose of the realm is ascribed to their service. While we are
yet not beyond collected consultation, a forward suggestion is made
toward collective counsel. In 1215 we find the strongest instance to
date of corporate capacity and representative responsibility expressed
in the 61st clause of the Maguz Carta, the communa totits terrae. It
manifests a groping for the representative principle when perfect
unanimity among the twenty-five barons is wanting. In 1226 the sheriffs
were ordered to cause the election of four law-worthy and discreet
knights for the purpose of meeting with the king at Lincoln and explaining to him (ad ostendendum) their complaints about the execution of
certain clauses of Magna Carta. Gradually, the predominantly administrative and judicial functions of feudal representation enlarges toward
national consultations of a political character. But the process is still
in its infancy. These representatives are not invested with a mandate
by their constituents; they do not decide the future; they simply "bear
the record" on past or present conditions. But their influence increased
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in the alliance with those nobles whose independent baronial franchises
and jurisdictions were being eliminated.
So we see that from the advent of William the Conqueror to 1226,
the year of Stephen Langton's representative assembly in London the
laity had expressed the representative idea by means of inquest and
the jury to such a point that the knights of the shire were brought
to the frontiers of political responsibility. In local affairs they had
already crossed the line between information and action, since they
were being used with increasing frequency as assessors and as collectors of taxes. These fiscal duties show that the knights were extending their functions beyond the juror's obligation to "find the facts,"
but before 1226, at least, the extension was strictly limited to local
tasks undertaken at the king's command, and these functions had no
direct political significance. They were without any mandate from the
communities, who had merely chosen the persons best suited to perform
the royal assignments. The authority upon which the knights acted
came, not from below, but from above. The magnates, on the other
hand, had full powers of counsel and consent, but each was present only
for himself; until the same powers were exercised by communities,
through their delegates, the essence of political representation was still
absent.
We must take notice, in addition to the inquest and the juries, of
another English experiment of the representative idea in the boroughs.
For the legal construction of these boroughs emphasizes communal
existence with greater force than did geographical units, the hundred
and the shire. Their internal organization and government contributes
a new and necessary step. toward political formation, namely, the election of the governors by the citizens. The prospering towns of the
twelfth century were favored with royal charters, and accordingly an
internal organization of the community develops with the grant of selfgovernment in return for a lump corporate tax, the firma burgi. This
new unity led naturally to the idea that one or more members might
act for the rest. Signs of political evolution appear in the election of
the mayor and common council to govern the borough on their behalf
However, this internal political representative government did not
extend beyond its own walls; there is still no direct share in the central
government, except in so far as representatives might be summoned to
the courts as witnesses or jurors, ad loquendum or ad ostendendum. To
achieve a national representative assembly, endowed with political
power, the knights and burgesses of the local units must yet join in common association transcending their own limited origins with mandates
from their constituents as to limit, control, and direct the sovereign

1954]

JURIDIC ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATION 1I

315

power of the realm. This political transcendence whereby the community of communities is realized in a national universitas could find
at hand the precedents of the hierarchical union of Dominican and Franciscan chapters. Not until an identity of interests between the communities exists and an intercommunal governance strives to achieve a
national good, as well as the particular local good, will a political representative government exist. To date on a national level, only representation for legal, fiscal, and administrative purposes existed, and, in
most instances, occurred, with the exception of the internal government
of the boroughs, at the royal behest. Even in such cases where an elective form was employed, the fact of election carried with it no general
power or responsibility. We maintain that political representative government must fulfill these conditions: first, the representatives must be
elected by the constituents in order that they be truly representatives
of the constituents; secondly, the election must accord with authoritative prescription to mark it with legal right, for a political act must
somehow be invested with sovereignty, i.e., public power; thirdly, these
representatives must be entrusted with a dual mandate for the general
and particular benefit; this mandate is temporal, revocable, and responsible, i.e., held to accountability; fourthly, these representatives by
virtue presumably of their superior competency owe judgment not obedience to their electors; fifthly, their commitment binds their electors
in justice. In a word, these representatives govern. All these conditions
were fulfilled in the thirteenth century England, most perfectly in the
Dominican Order. In the secular domain, the representative idea, vicarious action, and representative systems for the limited purposes of
information and action existed in the English juries in all its forms, viz.,
the lawful men who bore the record, and the knights who were summoned to give voice to local conditions. Only within the boroughs do
we find political representation and even here only inchoately. When
the knights of the shire convened under royal summons at central
assemblies, they still retained their individual rapport with the royal
court, i.e., they acted neither in cooperation nor, for that matter, did
they exercise their judgment in determination of royal authority.
TOWARD

REPRESENTATIVE

GOVEINMNT

The use of the proctorial mandate within the representative system
of the Friars and of the English convocations contributed operative
ideas toward the fruition of the secular practices. In the Catholic
Church itself representation never was more than the representation of
office and of dignitaries. The ecclesiastical influence comes predominantly from the Friars and from the gradual expanding descent of proc-

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

torial representation from the upper clergy to the lower clergy, from
the collegiate, capitular, communal clerics to the non-communal clerics.
The inviolable principle-quod omnes tangit-and the motive-financial exaction-were underscored by papal and oecumenical councils.
We will accordingly choose select instances when the two domains,
civil and ecclesiastical crossed on these lines and an identity of interests
promoted an identical resolution.
The first significant instance when the clerical position could not but
leave its mark on the thoughts and reflections of secular contemporaries occurred in 1254. Henry III had requested the bishops to agree
to the deflection of the triennial tenth, which had been granted for a
crusade, to the war in Gascony. When the bishops remonstrated that
this could not be done without the consent of their clergy, the crown
issued writs whereby the bishops were to induce their clergy to this
purpose, and requested that each diocese send representatives to report
their answer to the council. Simultaneously, similar writs were addressed to the sheriffs which directed that the shire courts assemble and
knights be elected for the identical objective. Let us observe these
facts; this is the first instance to our knowledge of the presence of clerical proctors at a central assembly; secondly, the clerical consent was
dependent on five conditions; 0 thirdly, these proctors were invested
with general powers of attorney, as it cannot be supposed that the five
conditions were drafted independently in each local assembly. From
this clerical precedent certain factors toward political evolution issue:
temporary and general mandates are entrusted by the constituents to
their proctors and the right to exercise personal, independent, responsible judgment in cooperation with others. Since these assemblies were
sectional and not public they are obviously not political. But the parallelism is unmistakable. The lower clergy as well as the prelates, the
nuncii of the chapters and of the colleges, are summoned by writ concurrently, and in a similar manner, and for an identical purpose as
are the knights of the shire. The significant addition is the dependence of the clerical consent on certain conditions, a practice that
will not be lost on the Parliaments of later years who appended list
of grievances as a condition to a financial grant. The effectiveness of
actual consent and the strength of its principle is evident in the declaration of the archdeaconry of Lincoln in 1255: "When it is proposed to
lay a burden on anyone, it is necessary to have his express consent."
Almost invariably every insistence on actual consent and every instance
of refusal to a grant is explicitly referred to the canon of 1215-quod
20. Lunt, Consent of the Lower Clergy 140 et seq.
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omnes tangit. This maxim, as VinogradofC- has shown, was widely
known in the thirteenth century, but it is significant that in England it
almost invariably occurs in an ecclesiastical text. The vogue may be
traced to its use by Innocent III when he regulated at the fourth
Lateran Council the discipline of the lower clergy.
In 1254, the two knights who were summoned from each shire to
come before the council at Westminster are invested with extended
commissions; they do not come simply to report on local information
or local opinion. To bear the record now means to answer exactly
(respondere precise) for their shires. It is a mandate from below, with
specified commission, it is true. But the intimate association of consent
with representation is overlapping from clerical experience to lay expedients. Was the provoking cause the action of the lower clergy at
the same time? The conjecture is more than suspicion. In 1268 twentyseven boroughs and cities are enjoined to send six representatives to
Westminster who were empowered to act in the name of their communities. As representation descends from the prelates to the lower
clergy, as it extends from collegiate, capitular, communal clergy to the
non-communal diocesan clergy, the practice and principle of consent
functioning through representation becomes a formidable limitation and
in time direction to the royal power through the proctorial mandate.
Our last consummate illustration is the Model Convocation of 1283
and its undoubted relation to Edward's Parliament of 1294. In 1283
Edward I motivated by the great financial strain of the war in Wales
enjoined the knights and burgheses of North and South to convene at
Northampton and York respectively on January 20th. To the same
purpose, he sent writs to the archbishop of Canterbury and York and
urgently requested them to secure the presence of lesser dignitaries and
clerical proctors at the same assemblies. The clergy of the Canterbury
province rejected the summons on the ground that they bad not been
properly called. Whereupon Archbishop Peckham sent out his own summons to the bishops with orders that they assemble their clergy and
declare to them the royal request, and then to require the attendance
of the archdeacons, two proctors from each diocese and one proctor
from each chapter at the convocation in London. These representatives
were to be entrusted with full and express powers (plenum et expressam

potestatem) to treat (ad tractandum) with the bishops and to consent
to those things which the community of the clergy shall determine. Let
us note that this convocation, known as Peckham's Model Convocation,
was due to the action of the clergy assembled at Northampton under
21.

2 Collected Papers 245 (1928).
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the royal summons; that the extension of representation to the diocesan
clergy is provoked by taxation with direct reference to quod omnes
tangit.
All that is now wanting for the conditions requisite to political representation is the extension of the proctorial mandate from taxation
to public legislation. The importance of the Model Convocation of 1283
is that the form the Church adopted for its own provincial synod is
used by Edward I for the inclusion of the Church as one of the estates of the realm in the Parliament of 1294. Edward's praemunientes
clause for clerical proctors with plenary powers widened the road for
the lay commons. This Parliament of estates was the public assembly
of a national society summoned by the sovereign power, elected by constituents to treat of fiscal matters and indirectly touching upon public
law. The point is that consent through representation upon matters
touching property had overlapped from the common cleric to tle common layman. Like a ferment, papal and oecumenical injunctions, the
Order of Friars, particularly of the Dominicans in England, the development of the English Provincial synod to the inclusion of the diocesan
clergy, had worked to the transfer and extension of the same principles activated with the same motive in the civil domain. Clerical representation was ever leading the way. They held forth experience, precedents, and influence as well. From the Norman22 inquest, Henry II's
juries, the corporate unity of the boroughs, the knight's "bearing the
record", there is a forward advance from information to action, from
consultation to consent, from virtual to actual representation, from
individual to corporate capacity, from collected to collective counsel
and consent, from assent to conditioned consent. The private character of religious Orders, the exempt status of ecclesiastics were no bar,
no insurmountable frontier to the influence of their internal governance
and relations to the Crown upon the public assimilation of the virtues
and lessons of their representative practices.
CONCLUDING ANIMADVERSIONS

In pursing together the primary and fundamental factors that operated to the evolution of a complex system of representative government we have discerned that it was governed by a dynamic logic inherent in the historic process; not indeed the logic of Hegelian idealism or
of abstract, a priori conceptualism, but the logic of human motives in
the light of avowed first principles, ". . . we dare not say," wrote Professor Powicke, "that it was inevitable or impersonal, and divorce it from
22.

Cf. White, The Making of the English Constitution 337-452 (1925).
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the convictions of ordinary men and women, for these convictions gave
it life."2 3 There is a danger of superficial empirical pragmatism that
would see in the representative system no more than its operational
function and attribute its raison d'etre solely to the stress of inventing
devices of government or suiting purely administrative convenience or
to the transient necessities of pressing utility, such as the need for
money. But there are other factors and amongst these the enduring
underlying spiritual forces that inspire human actions and fix them into
habits that are expressive of beliefs and convictions about human relations. We have studied the spiritual principles, their origin and application, which operated toward the development and growth of representative government in the civil domain. But we have stopped short
of the actual formation and maturity of this political-juridical institution. Before the English parliamentary system has grown to the maturity of representative government, it must secure three empowerments: complete control of all national revenue and expenditure, the
exclusive exercise of the legislative right by Parliament, including the
House of Commons as an equal partner in every act, and the power to
determine the general policy, foreign and domestic, which at any moment of time should give character and purpose to the government. In
a word, the representatives are invested with sovereign power and its
exercise.2 4 The struggle to win full control of national revenues and
23. England and Europe in the Thirteenth Century, Harvard Tercentenary Publications: Independence, Convergence, and Borrowing in Institutions, Thought and Art 145
(1937).
24. Present day scholars have differed on the interpretation and extent of power in
the thirteenth century consent of representatives. Professor Wilkinson of the University
of Toronto maintains that consent in the thirteenth century Parliament was, or became,
predominantly political. Wilkinson, The English Provincial Revolution of the 13th and
14th Centuries in England, 24 Speculum 10 (1949); Professor Gaines Post in a closey
evolved study has argued that consent even to taxation was consultative and judicial,
not political, and that plena potestas stood, not for political, sovereign consent but
judicial-consilia consent. Post, Plena Potestas and Consent in Medieval Assemblies,
I Traditio 355-408 (1943); J. G. Edwards argues that plena potestas in England implied an almost political or sovereign consent which limited the royal authority. And
he concludes that the historical genesis of the legal sovereignty of Parliament arose parfly
from the plena potestas of the representatives of the Commons and partly from
the character of Parliament as a high court. Edwards, The Plena Postestas of English Parliametary Representatives, Oxford Essays in Medieval History Presented to
H.E. Salter 141-154 (Powicke ed. 1934); C.H. Mc~hwain seems to conclude that the
consent expressed by plena potestas was more than a formality in that the representatives had some discretionary power (ad tractandum), which would naturally act as a
brake on the king's demands. Mclwain, Medieval Estates, 7 Cambridge Medieval History 679; similarly, but emphasizing more strongly the right of judgment and consent,
Clarke, Medieval Representation and Consent (1936). The extent of the juridical con-
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expenditures was to be long and severe. In legislation hardly even a
starting point for the new institution had yet been found, and in the
determination of the general policy, Parliament scarcely visioned such
a trust. But the historic continuity is unmistakable. Ethico-juridic
origins of political representation expand into the more assured constitutional and institutional developments of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and
sixteenth centuries. The Christian constitutionalism, which Bracton so
aptly expressed,2 5 was repeated in the fifteenth century by John Fortescue who, with explicit acknowledgments to St. Thomas Aquinas, distinguishes the dominium regale from the dominium politicum et regale
on the basis of the people's consent to legislation." The course of development was in general outline as follows: The Christian doctrine

of the equality of all men (by nature) would not tolerate any willful
human superiority save the supremacy of law and by the consent of coequals. The Carolingian capitudaria bear literal witness to the fermentation of these ideas upon political activity. The feudal doctrine of
consent on which rested the medieval coronation oath and all the contractual relations of the fief were concretized by specific reference to
taxation. It lacked, however, the element of representation. As the
feudal structure gave way to an organic communal society, the doctrine
of consent survived through the mediacy of the representative system.
Its individualism was modified through the maior et sanior pars prosequences which Miss Clarke deduces from the Modus Tenendi Parliamentum is conslderably mitigated by the doubt cast about the date and authenticity of the description of
Parliament contained therein. Nonetheless, its significance rests on the betrayal of such
conceptions though they may be prematurely ascribed to historical actuality. Pluncknett, to the contrary, has held that plena potestas was an expression of involuntary consent to the acts and decisions of the royal government. Pluncknett, Parliament, I Willard
and Morris, The English Government at Work 1327-1336, 101 et seq. (1940).
25. "The king is subject to God and the law because the law made him king. Let
the king attribute to law what the law attributes to him, namely, dominion and power.
There is no king where will and not the law dominates."
26. The first chapter of the De Monarchia: "There bith ij kyndes off kyngedomes, of
the wich that one is a lordship callid in laten dominum regale, and that other is callid
dominum politicum et regale. And thai diversen in that the first kynge mey rule his
peple bi suche lawes as he makyth hym self. And therfore he mey sett uppon thalm
tayles and other imposicions, such as he wol hym self, withowt thair assent. The secounde
kynge mey not rule his peple by other lawes than such as thai assenten unto. And therfore he mey sett uppon thaim non imposicions withowt thair owne assent. This diversity
is wel taught bi Seynt Thomas in his boke which he wrote ad regent Cipri de regimine
principum." Fortescue, The Governance of England 109 (Plummer ed. 1885). In this was
Sir John Fortesque sought in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas a philosophical basis
for the constitutional regime in England and for the rule that the King as a constitutional
monarch needed the consent of Parliament to the imposing of taxes and the making
of laws.
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cedural application of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur. In
this wise absenteeism and the dissident vote did not impede the development of corporate capacity and responsibility. The conjunction of
consent with representation must be attributed to ecclesiastical origins,
to the fourth Lateran Council as the most universalizing force, to the
precedents of the Black Friars, to the expansion of the English Church
Councils from 1226 onwards, and to the principle applied first in connection with taxes on "Spiritualities," that taxation demands both rep-resentation and consent. These antecedents laid the foundation of the
power of the Commons. From consent for taxation to consent for legislation the illation was a matter of historical actuality and logically follows upon action touching rem et personam. In general outline, the
course of the process was: from no taxation without consent to no taxation without representation to no legislation without consent and representation. The principles, precedents, and motives arise out of ecclesiastical history and flow into the civil domain. The vaior et sanior pars
is in accord with the Christian virtue of prudence. The sanior pars finds
the formal unit for numbers outside itself--in reason-and while men,
even in the majority, are still fallible this procedure allows for peaceful
change and progress. The sanior pars accordingly distinguishes the
salutary majority decision from the absolutism of majority rule. The
-naior pars is simply a human expediency to express corporate capacity
and responsibility. 28
And so we conclude our companion study to the Politia trilogy.
Therein we maintained that sound constitutionalism is of medieval
provenance. In this study we have reviewed the indebtedness of sound
representative governance to Catholic medieval history.
"Looking back over the space of a thousand years, which we call the
Middle Ages, to get an estimate of the work they had done, if not towards perfection in their institutions, at least, towards attaining the
knowledge of political truth, this is what we find: Representative government, which was unknown to the ancients, was almost universal. The
methods of election were crude; but the principle that no tax was lawful that was not granted by the class that paid it,-that is, that taxation
was inseparable from representation-was recognized not as a privilege
of certain countries, but as the right of all. Not a prince in the world,
said Philip de Commines, can levy a penny without the consent of the
people. Slavery was almost everywhere extinct; and absolute power
was deemed more intolerable than slavery. The right of insurrection
27. Costanzo, Catholic Politeia IT,21 Ford. L. Rev. 270-275 (1952).
28. Cf. Guizot, History of the Origin of Representative Government in Europe 62
(Scohle trans. 1861).
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was not only admitted but defined as a duty sanctioned by religion.
Even the principles of the Hdbeas Corpus Act, and the method of the
Income Tax were already known. The issue of ancient politics was an
absolute State planted on slavery. The political produce of the Middle
Ages was a system of States in which authority was restricted by the
representation of powerful classes, by privileged associations, and by
the acknowledgment of duties superior to those which are imposed
29
by man.
29. Acton, History of Freedom 39 (1922).

